

SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE

1. Your message of 2 November is taken as being of the greatest importance and significance. The answer to the specific question you raise is given in paragraph 4 below.
2. We hold to what was said jointly and in public by the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach in Brussels on 29 October. A copy of the Statement is annexed. There can be no departure from what is said there and in particular its statement that there could be no secret agreements or understandings between Governments and organisations supporting violence as a price for its cessation and its call on them to renounce for good the use of, or support for, violence. There can also be no departure from the constitutional guarantee that Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom will not change without the consent of a majority of its people.
3. It is the public and consistent position of the British Government that any dialogue could only follow a permanent end to violent activity.
4. You ask about the sequence of events in the event of a total end to hostilities. If, as you have offered, you were to give us an unequivocal assurance that violence has indeed been brought to a permanent end, and that accordingly Sinn Fein is now committed to political progress by peaceful and democratic means alone, we will make clear publicly our commitment to enter exploratory dialogue with you. Our public statement will make clear that, provided your private assurance is promptly confirmed publicly after our public statement and that events on the ground are fully consistent with this, a first meeting for exploratory dialogue will take place within a week of Parliament's return in January.
5. Exploratory dialogue will have the following purposes:

PROCEDURAL ANNEX

1. This Annex covers procedural questions concerning the exploratory dialogue which may be initiated on the basis, and only on the basis, that violence has been brought to a permanent end, and that a private assurance to that effect has been given, and confirmed publicly, and which has been demonstrated to have been put into effect.
2. The sequence of events would be as follows:
 - (i) there is an unequivocal private assurance that violence has been brought to a permanent end, and accordingly that Sinn Fein has affirmed that it is henceforth committed to political progress by peaceful and democratic means alone;
 - (ii) soon after receiving the necessary satisfactory assurance, and on the assumption that events on the ground are consistent with this assurance, we will make a public statement, indicating our agreement in principle to enter exploratory dialogue in January provided the private assurance is promptly confirmed publicly and continues to be demonstrated on the ground;
 - (iii) if a genuine end to violence is brought about within the next few days, a first meeting for exploratory dialogue would take place within a week of Parliament's return in January. This interval is to demonstrate the genuineness of the ending of violence, and the meeting will only take place if events on the ground have remained consistent with the assurance that violence had genuinely been brought to an end. Logistical arrangements (e.g. venue, transport, security and other administration matters) will need to have been settled shortly beforehand.

- (i) to explore the basis upon which Sinn Fein would come to be admitted to an inclusive political talks process to which the British Government is committed but without anticipating the negotiations within that process;
- (ii) to exchange views on how Sinn Fein would be able over a period to play the same part as the current constitutional parties in the public life of Northern Ireland;
- (iii) to examine the practical consequences of the ending of violence.

6. The attached Annex summarises the sequence of events and provides answers to the procedural questions concerning exploratory dialogue which have been raised.

7. If, in advance of our public statement, any public statement is made on your behalf which appears to us inconsistent with this basis for proceeding it would not be possible for us then to proceed.

8. If we receive the necessary assurance, which you have offered, that violence has been brought to an end, we shall assume that you are assenting to the basis for proceeding explained in this note and its attachment.

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3. At the first meeting of exploratory dialogue each party could field up to three delegates to be seated at the table. The possible need for the additional presence of advisers on each side is something which could be addressed at the logistical meeting.
4. It is for each party to decide who should represent it at this and at subsequent meetings. (The composition of each party's team may of course be changed from time to time, as each party wishes.) It is assumed that each party will wish its representatives to have the seniority appropriate to its authorised representatives. The British side will be represented by senior officials acting under political authority and direction.
5. At the first, and any subsequent, exploratory meeting the delegation size or other logistical arrangements can be modified with the agreement of both parties.

JOINT STATEMENT OF 29 OCTOBER 1993

1. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach discussed a range of matters of common interest, with particular focus on Northern Ireland.
2. They condemned the recent terrorist outrages as murderous and premeditated acts which could serve no end other than to deepen the bloodshed in Northern Ireland. They expressed their deep sympathy to the innocent victims, children, women and men who had been injured or bereaved.
3. The Prime Minister and Taoiseach called for restraint from all members of the community in Northern Ireland; expressed support for the security forces in their fight against all forms of terrorism; and noted the recent successes of cross-border security co-operation.
4. They utterly repudiated the use of violence for political ends. Their two Governments were resolute in their determination to ensure that those who adopted or supported such methods should never succeed.
5. The Taoiseach gave the Prime Minister an account of the outcome of the Hume/Adams dialogue, in the light of the Irish Government's own assessment of these and other related matters. They acknowledged John Hume's courageous and imaginative efforts. The Prime Minister and Taoiseach agreed that any initiative can only be taken by the two Governments, and that there could be no question of their adopting or endorsing the report of the dialogue which was recently given to the Taoiseach and which had not been passed on to the British Government. They agreed that the two Governments must continue to work together in their own terms on a framework for peace, stability and reconciliation, consistent with their international obligations and their wider responsibilities to both communities.

6. Against this background the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach reaffirmed that:

- The situation in Northern Ireland should never be changed by violence or the threat of violence;
- Any political settlement must depend on consent freely given in the absence of force or intimidation;
- Negotiations on a political settlement could only take place between democratic governments and parties committed exclusively to constitutional methods and consequently there can be no talks or negotiations between their Governments and those who use, threaten or support violence for political ends;
- There could be no secret agreements or understandings between Governments and organisations supporting violence as a price for its cessation;
- All those claiming a serious interest in advancing the cause of peace in Ireland should renounce for good the use of, or support for, violence;
- If and when such a renunciation of violence had been made and sufficiently demonstrated, new doors could open, and both Governments would wish to respond imaginatively to the new situation which would arise.

7. The Prime Minister and Taoiseach renewed their support for the objectives of the Talks process involving political dialogue between the two Governments and the main constitutional parties in Northern Ireland. They regard that process as vital and its objectives as valid and achievable. They urged the Northern Ireland parties to intensify their efforts to find a basis for new talks. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister agreed that the two Governments will continue their discussions to provide a framework to carry the process forward.

5/11/53.

- The substantive response which follows was given to June by Fred on 5/11/53 at Duncary (see "most urgent" 8/11/53 doc.)
- It is dated by S.F. version (pp41) and B. Gov version (pp46) as 5/11/53.
- S.F. say that this is a response to a message which B. Gov. claim S.F. sent to them on 2/11/53.
- S.F. say it did not send the 2/11/53 message + that it is bogus. - so it is! (see "most urgent" 8/11/53 doc).
- S.F. said it received the substantive response and the bogus message of 2/11/53 purporting to come from S.F. simultaneously on the evening of 5/11/53.
- S.F. also say that this substantive response is in fact the B. Gov. response to S.F. May 10 document.
- A draft of this substantive response was mentioned in a meeting on 15/5/53 between S.F. and B. Gov. reps. but it was not handed over then.
- * S.F. (pp41) also say that this response was discussed at Cabinet level on 17/5/53 + 18/5/53.

which really set their ~~S.F~~ S.F. alarm bells ringing + that was compounded by Mayhew's statement of Sat. 27 Nov. ~~that~~ "The war is over..."

Para. 4 of the substantive response (5/11/93 Dunedun) which claims that the IRA had offered a total + permanent end to hostilities via the contact at the meeting in London on 2nd Nov 93 is what created the S.F. anger and not Mc Guinness's statement, because they (S.F.) didn't know the ~~the~~ existence of it, even ~~the~~ less the wording of it until 27/Nov. 93 + Mayhew's release.

* The "conflict is over" statement was a serious risk to the Adams/McG (faction) in the evenly balanced, all-ruling Army Council of the IRA.

* ~~It~~ either of the Brit. Gov. statements i.e. Substantive Response Dunedun 5/11/93 or "the war is over" ~~at~~ 2/11/93 supposedly from McG was so dangerous internally to the A.C. Council that the Ad/McG (faction) ~~sp~~ simply could not live with them. Therefore, And ~~that~~ their position in attempting to promote peace could not live with the ambiguity of the British saying they were ~~the~~ (Ad + McG) were offering surrender. The line of contact had to be destroyed if the ~~IRA~~ Ad/McG (faction) were to survive in the potentially hostile environment of the A.C.

10/2/08.

V.I.P.

- 2nd Nov. "War is over".
- 5th Nov B.G. "Substantive Response" to "War is over".
- Please note here that as yet Rep. Mav. are unaware of "War is over".
- However, when they get the "Substantive Response" and see "a total end to hostilities etc etc" And the introductory sentence "Your message of 2nd Nov" they realise that something big was offered on their behalf.
- 8th Nov 93
B.D. sends "Most urgent" retraction that Rep. Mav. sent the 2nd Nov "war is over" and asks that the record be put straight.
Questions - did he do it independently.
- Co-incidence or not - that Mollie reveals contact on this same day
- NB. The retraction refers to the whole statement is "the war is over" and not just the sending of it.

P.T.D.